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Collected Papers of Paul Vinogradoff. With a Memoir by the Right Hon.
H. A. L. Fisher. New York, Oxford University Press, 1928. Vol. I-
Historical. pp. viii, 326. Vol. I-Jurisprudence. pp. viii, .309. 42s.
We owe these disjecta membra of a life filled with what Mr. Fisher
aptly calls one of "cyclopean toil" to the devotion of Lady Vinogradoff.
It is a worthy tribute to the memory of her distinguished husband. No
doubt various papers are now brought together which in this age of much
printing would have escaped the diligence even of the interested expert.
Among the forty-six papers here collected, two of them (one on Church
law and the other on Sources) were intended as chapters of a third volume
of the author's Outlines of Historical Jurisprudence and lack his final
supervision. Another paper entitled Some Problems of Anglo-Norman
Legal History is an address delivered to the SociCtI d'Histoire du Droit
at Paris in December, 1925, a few days before his death. As Professor
Joflon des Longrais, the editor of this paper, remarks, it was doubtless
the last thing Vindgradoff wrote. It should be pointed out that this collec-
tion of papers represents but a small fraction of the author's writings,
and even if we except from consideration his book publications, a large
fraction would still remain. In the list of his publications are entered
266 items. In addition to this formidable enumeration there are prefaces
to eight volumes of Oxford Studies and numerous public and private lec-
tures. Vinogradoff's first publication appeared in the year 1876. He died
in his seventy-first year. Such in briefest outline is the literary monument
of fifty years of productive scholarship.
The memoir by Right Hon. H. A. L. Fisher which introduces these volumes
is deserving of high praise. It is a biographic statement which leads up
from Vinogradoff's birth at Kostroma in Russia in 1854 to his sudden death
in Paris in 1925. The numerous intervening facts are woven together with
consummate skill and these facts are treated with a masterful competence.
By its charm of composition the memoir conceals the extensive learning
and much of the labor necessary for its production. Convention requires
that a testimonial of this kind be friendly, but this memorial reaches that
end without effusion and it never leaves the path of good taste and sound
judgment. It is a brilliant preliminary to the technical aridities that follow.
Vinogradoff was accomplished in many things. He was linguist, phil-
ologist, economist, lawyer, jurist, governmentalist, sociographer, historian,
musician, and much besides. There was a time when a man might reach
first rank in several specialities. Thus, da Vinci was painter, sculptor,
musician, architect, engineer, scientist, and mechanician. Goethe was
lawyer, soldier, scientist, philosopher, poet, dramatist, theatre director, and,
emphatically, much besides. To speak, however, of more recent times, we
find Kohler who was engineer, lawyer, jurist, poet, musician, etc. So great
has become the specialization of knowledge that it is unlilkely that a man
in this age can reach the highest competence in more than one field or be
more than a dilettante in any field if his energies are divided. The gift
of common sense, which Vinogradoff more than once has emphasized, will
carry one very far but hardly far enough to master various diverze and
intricate specialities. The labels, economist, lawyer, jurist, etc., cover
enormous stretches of knowledge and each of them must be more or less
minutely divided to make possible any genuine specialism unless there can
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be found a short-cut to take the place of the quantum of human enofgy
necessary to master any science. Vinogradoff possessed the key. It was
not simply that he was very industrious, or that his mental and physical
equipment were finely adjusted-these factors are essential-but he was
able to get what was necessary with a minimum of effort because he had,
the language access to the world's accumulated stores of knowledge which
must be mastered in any science. We believe this is the explanation of
his breadth of interests and of his writings.
In middle life, Vinogradoff already had a reading knowledge of at least
a dozen languages, and in Russian, English, French, German, Italian, and
Norse he could "speak and write with force and distinction." These pre-
cisely are the leading languages of art, science, history, and philosophy,
Vinogradoff could take at first hand what for the average man can only
be known at second hand or with laborious difficulty or not at all. And
yet with his powerful equipment of classical and modern languages, it can
hardly be said that Vinogradoff had attained unquestioned primacy in more
than one field. This one field was medieval agrarian economics and social
organization. Here undoubtedly he had no superior, whether the com-
parison be limited to England or whether it be extended to comparative law.
In this field his word was the most potent that could be spoken by any
living man.
He did not confine himself to the antiquities of the land system or to
kinship structures. His activities naturally extended to the details of
early English legal history but here a comparable intellect was the monarch
of a kingdom. That ruler was Maitland, Downing Professor at Cambridge
(1888-1906).
It was but another step to an abstract history of legal ideas. That step
gave us chiefly the Outlines of Historical Jurisprudence (1920-22), the last
of his large works, in two published volumes, which unfortunately was not
completed. A collateral activity led to another field of research which may
be described by the term, theoretical jurisprudence, to which much of the
second volume of this collection is devoted. These four departments--
medieval economics, legal history, historical jurisprudence, and theoretical
jurisprudence-are the ones that chiefly concern our profession. There was
much writing and effort on questions of pure political science, Russian
politics, education, general history, and sociology, which do not enter into
the present discussion, however important may be these activities in them-
selves and in disclosing the wide compass of Vinogradoff's interests. His
urge to create was so insistent and his information so extensive that they
could not be bounded by any demands of specialism. It is understandable,
too, how accident plays a large part in matters of this kind. Because of
his great fame throughout all of Europe and America, Vinogradoff was
constantly under pressure for one purpose and another to draw upon his
rich stores of knowledge and no doubt his generous nature led him into
many unreckoned academic ventures that would of necessity disturb any
creative program that he may have formulated. But, because of the dif-
fusion of effort in many directions, he was led by a boundless curiosity
and a restless energy to enter into fields of science, where, though he might
be a superior among superiors, yet he must submit to the iudicihm parium
suorum. The same observation must be made for any scholar great or
little. This is not criticism but only explanation. While we believe there
is a distinct difference in the merit of Vinogradoff's historical writing in
comparison with his excursions into certain fields of jurisprudence and
also a difference in quality in the period antedating his profound disappoint-
ment in the turn of political affairs in Russia as against the few remain-
ing years that followed, yet everywhere we see the operation of a well
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balanced judgment. For example, in his discussion of so-called juridical
persons, we do not find him following the emxtreme view of Gierhe and
Maitland and of many others that corporations are real beings nor do
we find him swinging to the other extreme of saying that a corporation
cannot be chargeable for pecuniary damages arising out of malice. Again,
in his discussion of the nature of the State, we find Vinogradoff taking a
moderate position between such extremes as those of Hobbes and Duguit.
Vinogradoff had the true mark of the scholar-he always went to the
original sources. It is rare that he used a translation of anything. He
not only employed the original sources but he invariably made use, not of the
most convenient, but of the best editions. Vinogradoff was not much in-
terested in mere verbal distinctions nor did he seem concerned about mere
words. He could speak of the king taking the "hook," which might be well
enough at Hampstead but would be shocking at Oxford. He could also
take the Frisian name of Jhering (Yair-ing), whose works he knew from
end to end, and write it in English as E-a-ring (Ihering). Verbal errors
which had sunk their roots into a language did not disturb him. He was
more concerned about the substance of things. His training in the critical
method of dealing with historical materials was carried over into those
researches that do not have a basis in cartularies, court rolls, chirographa,
and other archival documents. When, therefore, he ventured into realms
somewhat apart, he wrote with impressive competence even if not always
with genuine originality.
We have already suggested several important qualities, traits, and
methods that would account for Vinogradoff's literary fertility and Eeien-
tific distinction-sound common sense, a critical approach to all evidence,
intellectual curiosity, and matchless familiarity with the literature of legal
science in all European languages. But there is something further and per-
haps not less important than these endowments, given or acquired. He
was also the favorite of the gods. In 1883 he came to England for the
first time to make studies in history for the purposes of a doctoral thesis.
In 1884 he published a letter announcing his discovery of Bracton's note-
book. The complete story is well known. It was an astonishing fact that
a foreigner could after a few month's residence in England, put his hands
on and identify a manuscript of such great historical interest. This bril-
liant discovery led to two very important consequences. About three ycars
later, Maitland published his famous edition of the Notebook (18S7). This
discovery led finally to Vinogradoff's appointment (1903) to the Corpus
chair at Oxford. In a word, this historical accident was the starting point
of a very remarkable legal-historical renaissance in England, culminating in
the recent nine-volume edition of Holdsworth's History of English Law.
The startling discovery of the Veronese palimpscst codex of Gains in 1816,
first by Haubold, and again, by Niebuhr, had important concrete results
for the exposition of Roman law, but the discovery of Bracton's notebooh
affected not so much the exposition of early English law as that it put
in motion a great wave of learned researches which have led to a revolu-
tionary reconstruction of English legal history on a new basis of rigid
criticism.
While the two volumes are labeled respectively History, and Jurispru-
dence, yet the labels are not to be taken seriously. There is much in them
that is neither history nor jurisprudence in any accurate sense, and in the
jurisprudence volume there are several papers--especially among the ones
in German-that clearly belong to the history volume. Speahing generally,
&nd with allowance for some exceptions on both sides of the ledger, the
history papers impress us more than the jurisprudence papers. In the his-
tory division, the writer carries with him the impedimenta of a conquer-
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ing general. In the jurisprudence papers, the writer hardly even rises
above a gentlemanly competence. The latter papers lack thematic novelty,
unrelieved by such contrapuntal devices as Maitland, for example, would
have introduced, or such melodic variations as Maine would have employed.
These latter papers are simply unimaginative and heavy reflections of a
great scholar who somewhat late in life had come into contact with a
series of questions which long before he had learned to answer. It will
not be possible within the limit of a book review to consider in detail the
forty-odd papers now collected. A few words emphasizing the foreign
language papers for the information of the general reader must suffice.
The paper on the Text of Bracton, already well known to most of the
readers of this Journal, dealing with the edition of Sir Travers Twiss, was
a devastating one. It still puts fear into the heart of any man who under-
takes any translation of anything, and especially of any antiquity-and
who in academic circles has not sinned? As is well known, the practical
effect of this repudiation of the Twiss edition has been the beginning in
recent years of a critical edition of Bracton by Woodbine. The next paper
on Folkland annihilates a theory supported by twenty-one experts-among
them Stubbs, Pollock, Maur, and Brunner. Folkland was ager privatus.
The paper on Buchland is demonstrated to have a Roman origin arising
out of privilegia and developed in ecclesiastical law. The paper on Praxis
der Englisehen Staatseinrichtungen is a treatment of the same matters dis-
cussed in Anson's Law and Custom. It shows how in England, in adminis-
trative matters, the need of democracy is adjusted to the requirement of
stability and enlightenment in government. The paper on Frcic Rcohts-
prechung is a rather venturesome attempt to show how Athenian democracy
solved the problem of richtiges Recht. Gesehlecht und Vcrvandschaft Is
an examination of the Norwegian kinship system. It is directed to an
attack on unscientific generalization in the evolution of legal ideas and "die
Luftgebilde der wissenschaftlichen Konstruktion." "All history is a flow
of development and it does not submit to rigid forms." The concrete find-
ings of this essay are in part repeated in the Outlines. This study shows
the sound historical instinct of the scholar in this, that Norway has been
less affected by infiltrations of foreign stocks than any other part of Europe.
The attempt to explain the survival of matrilineal residues in the Germania
by assuming the possibility of a slave class which carried the custom for-
ward would be less likely to affect the Norse situation where the influence
of diffusion was outward rather than inward. Wergeld und Stand is an
examination of the views of Heck, Wittich, Mayer, Seebohm ("Tribal
Custom"), and Brunner on medieval social organization. It shows how
the rating of social classes was affected by the Roman monetary system,
and also the variations among the various German stocks. The paper,
Les Maximes dans 1ancien droit commun anglais, is an interesting and
valuable account of how the Roman sources entered into the making of
our law in the early centuries. "Queiques probl~mes d'histoirc du droit
anglo-normand" presents a theory to account for what Maitland called a
revolution, in the second half of the twelfth century, from Anglo-Saxon
or Anglo-Danish customs to Anglo-Norman law. He proposes that the in-
terests and ideas of the military class were the decisive factor of the
sudden change.
These essays are not for the general reader. They are written by a
specialist for the specialist and are to be appraised on that basis. It
would have been possible for Lady Vinogradoff, out of the large amount
of available material, to have made a collection of Sir Paul's writings
with a much wider appeal to our profession. As suggestions of what was
feasible, we point to the eight articles written in 1910 for the Encycloptedia
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Britannica, some of the articles written in 1911 for the Reallexikon (Strass-
burg), the articles (1917) in Hasting's Encyclopedia, various book prefaces,
book reviews of a monographic nature, and various addresses. The first
volume of the present collection contains several e.zamples of the type of
article which can be read without too much demand on the readers' famil-
iarity with the offensive technicalisms of history or jurisprudence. Yet
if one may speculate on the matter, we venture to believe that Vinogradoff
himself would have preferred the sort of chrestomathy now published. His
knowledge of historical matters was so sharply defined that it could not,
unless thinned out, as for example in his Common Sense in Law, sink deeply
into the mentality of the bonus vir.
We believe Mr. Fisher is entirely right in saying that Vinogradoff "ranks
high among the intellectual athletes of history" and that "if a list be made
of those who ... have rendered illustrious service" to the advancement of
the critical departments of law "the name of Vinogradoff must be inscribed
upon it." This will be true for his researches in history, if it extends no
farther. Historical research can rarely furnish a sensation. Physical
science, mathematics (e.g., Riemann), philosophy (c.g., Bergson), linguistics
(e.g., Champollion), and other fields may bring new ideas which must be
noticed in the superficial commonplaces of polite conversation, but historical
research will not once in a century emerge from its monlish cell to vwarm
the hearts of men or to garnish the warmed-over cabbage, the cmarabc
repetita, of table talk.
Vinogradoff does not show himself as an expositor in these papers but
rather as a discovering historian. He never moves very far from concrete
facts. His Outlines of Historical Jurisprudence will not make the popular
appeal of Ancient Law simply because the critical method does not toler-
ate the perils of a luftgebildcide Konstrdution involved in all generaliza-
tions. The Outlines are not world-embracing syntheses of legal evolution
but a series of monographic studies comparable to the Etzdt, d'Idstoirc di,
drait of Dareste, confined to concrete historical data. This method if long
used will profoundly affect the writer's point of view no less than his
literary style. It may be here observed that there is a covenant of per-
petual hostility sealed by nature between the historian and the analytical
jurist. The historian must have his phenomena in motion. The analytical
jurist puts his data in a rigid frame of reference. The two attitudes can-
not be easily reconciled. Vinogradoff, therefore, will long be remembered as
a historian when his promenades in the analytical field will be forgotten.
We have already noticed the differences in the researches in history as
against other fields (e.g., art, science, philosophy). The nature of historical
work, therefore, is such that only rarely, if ever, can any man be a path-
breaker in a large sense. He must work minutely with numerous details,
the discovery of which has only a narrow influence on other facts. Vinogra-
doff's fame will not survive because of an epochal reconstruction with signif-
icant external effects, although in his studies of villeinage and of the manor
and in other directions his labors are of very great importance to the histor-
ian either in altering a view embracing a wide range of historical facts or
in detail. Vinogradoff has set many things right in legal and social history
but he will be longest remembered as a powerful catalytic force which
decomposed many historical errors and produced changes of the highest
importance in the whole field of historical research, especially as applied
to law in England. The extent of this influence upon Maitland and many
others is immeasurable. He well deserved to be one of that great trium-
virate at Oxfdord which included Maine and Pollock.
Northwestern University ALBmnr Kocom ic.
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Real Covenants and Other Interests Which "Run With Land," Including
Licenses, Easements, Profits, Equitable Restrictions and Rents. By
Charles E. Clark. Chicago, Callaghan & Company, 1929. pp. xxv, 201.
$3.50.
From the dry-as-dust repetition of the average text and from the de-
tailed exposition of the exhaustive treatise it is refreshing to turn to a
work like this, reasoned and readable, short enough to be interesting but
long enough to cover the subject. Much of the matter has already appeared
in print in the form of law review articles, the chapter on Licenses dating
back to the Columbia Law Review of December 1921, that on The Running
of Real Covenants to the Yale Law Journal of December 1922 and the
chapter on Party Wall Agreements as Real Covenants to the Harvard Law
Review of January 1924. The remaining chapters have appeared in the
current Yale Law Journal or are new. Additions have been made to the
chapters of earlier date, especially to the more controversial chapter on
the Running of Real Covenants.
The interests considered in this volume are those non-possessory interests
in or attached to land commonly treated under the head of "rights in the
land of another" or "incorporeal hereditaments." "Many of the incorporeal
hereditaments listed by Blackstone (2 Commentaries, Ch. III), such as
advowsons, corodies, officers, tithes and dignities which are unknown or
of no importance in this country" are omitted while covenants and equitable
restrictions, which are not listed by Blackstone, are included. Thus In-
terests presenting similar problems are grouped whatever their common-
law classification.
The long list of incorporeal hereditaments enumerated by Blackstone
shows that whatever difficulty the medieval common law may have had
in conceiving of the transfer of a right without the transfer of a thing,
it had no difficulty in conceiving of non-possessory interests as things and
therefore transferable.1 Whatever conception the medieval common law
started from, therefore, it allowed a wealth of property interests in land
that has been the despair of the modern searcher for free trade in land in
England. A large part of these interests were non-possessory but if one
"had" such an interest he could transfer it. If it had been divested he no
longer "had" it and it could not be transferred. To use the language of
the later law, a chose in action was not transferable but the fact that an
interest was non-possessory did not make it a chose in action.
Perhaps the best example of the extremes to which the medieval com-
mon law went in recognizing non-possessory property interests in land
was in the case of rent. The most common kind of rent was of course
feudal and after the Statute of Quia Emptores feudal rent became some-
thing that had existed time out of mind and ceased to be the matter of
express agreement but rent service might still arise by express agreement
where the transfer was not in fee simple and rents charge and rents see
were still possible on a transfer of the fee simple notwithstanding the
statute. Obligations of the most diverse character were included under
the conception of rent. These obligations-or such they would seem to
us-ran with the land andordinarily were incident to some interest in
land though they might be detached and exist in gross. So far did the
medieval common law carry the idea that these non-possessory interests
were really in the nature of property interests that it extended to them
the benefit of the possessory actions and, as it was chary of its actions,
denied them in general the action of covenant. This anomalous treatment
I See 2 POLLOCKC & MAITLAND, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW (2d ed. 1899)
124-149.
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of rent makes it understandable how in a world where interests, which seem
to us properly obligations attached to and running with land, played a
large part, the notion of covenants running and attached to land should have
so largely disappeared that notwithstanding the early cases of actions on
covenants given by Professor Clark and notwithstanding PaI:cnh-za'o Cace,
the preamble of 32 HEN. viii, c. 34 could be taken to mean that at
common law covenants did not run with the land. As said by Lord Justice
Lindley in denying the running of the burden of a covenant with the fRe,
one who knew his law could have accomplished the same thing by means
of a rent charge.2 The running of covenants in the Middle Ages, there-
fore, does not have to be explained by analogy to express warranties. What
has to be explained is that the running of such covenants disappeared to
the extent that it did. Professor Clark has rendered a grsat servic in
showing how little basis there is for letting the old law of warranties affect
the general law today as to covenants running with the land.
Another service that Professor Clark has performed has been to free
the law from the bondage of Lord Kenyon's dictum in Webb v. Rtewsll 3
that for a covenant to run there must be privity of estate between the
covenantor and covenantee. This dictum is apparently without foundation
in the English case law and was a misreading of the rules as to collateral
covenants and as to covenants with a stranger to the title. The real dif-
ficulty as to privity of estate in the case was as between the mortgagor,
the covenantee, and the one holding under the mortgagee. Lord Kenyon
was a lawyer of very narrow training who was inclined to go off half-
cocked and this dictum would seem to have been a consequence of that
tendency. Whatever reason there may be for confining the running of
covenants to such as are contained in conveyances, that reason would not
obtain in Webb v. Rzssell for the covenant there was contained in what
at least purported to be a lease.
The discarding of false analogies as to warranties and of the dictum
of Lord Kenyon in Webb v,. Russell is not of itself of great importance
but becomes such as incidental to the elimination of "false notions of
history" that "have hampered the development of a consistent modern
doctrine." It is this "consistent modern doctrine" that is Professor Clark's
aim. Such a doctrine is worked out with surprising clarity and convincing-
ness and ought to have great weight in any future consideraton of the
matter. Privity of estate as a requirement of the running of covenant3
with land is confined to "succession to the estate of one of the parties to
the covenant." Privity of estate as meaning "succession of estate also
between covenantor and covenantee" or as meaning "mutual and simul-
taneous interests of the parties in the same land" is eliminated.
The same clarity and convincingness that mark Professor Clark's treat-
ment of covenants running with the land characterize his treatment of
other topics such as the doctrine of Wood v. Lcadbitter,4 the assignability
of easements in gross, and many others too numerous to mention. The
sterility of much of the legal thinking in this country has no better illus-
tration than the docility with which Wood v. Lcadbitbt" was followed until
an English court overruled it.,
Such a work as this of Professor Clark shows what a modern, progre3-
sive statement of the common law can be. It is the sort of thing that
judges and lawyers can look to for help when they most need it.
Iowa College of Law PERCY BormwtL.
2 Austerberry v. Oldham, [1385] 29 Ch. D. 7.50.
33 T. R. 393 (1789).
413 M. & W. 838 (1845).
5 Hurst v. Picture Theatres, Ltd., [1915] 1 K. B. 1.
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The Court of Appeals of Maryland, A History. By Carroll T. Bond. Balti-
more, Barton-Gillet Co., 1928. pp. iii, 214.
This book is the result of a most careful and exhaustive study of all
the judicial records of Maryland courts in the custody of the Maryland
Court of Appeals, as well as all contemporary illustrative literature and
comment.
The work was prepared primarily for the Maryland bar, on the occasion
of the 150th Anniversary of the Court as organized under the State Gov-
ernment, and therefore it is of peculiar interest and importance to Mary-
land lawyers. It has, however, a much wider interest than this purely local
one, because the organization and early practice of the Maryland Court
of Appeals was substantially the same as that of all English-speaking
courts of those times.
The court, established in the seventeenth century, was a reproduction
of the jurisdiction of Parliament in error, long established in England and
surviving these now in the appellate jurisdiction of the House of Lords.
Its history is the history of an English institution transplanted to Amorl-
can soil, and developing from its administiation by country gentlemen or
planters into a modern tribunal manned by efficient and effective lawyers
and held in high esteem .throughout the country.
The make-up of the book is thoroughly good. The style is concise and
exact. There are many half-tone reproductions of old records and interest-
ing portraits and pictures.
The author has just been awarded the degree of LL.D. by Johns Hopkins
University, which is a tribute both to the excellence of this work and to
the pre-eminence his legal and judicial career have won for him.
Annapolis, Maryland ALBERT C. RITCIEi.
To The Pure. A Study of Obscenity and the Censor. By Morris L. Ernst
and William Seagle. New York, The Viking Press, 1928. pp. xiv, 336,
$3.
The "Boston Book Party of 1927," which caused the suppression of
Dreiser's An American Tragedy, Lewis' Elmer Gantry, Sinclair's Oil and
almost every other book of literary value in that year, raises the question
considered in the above book, of the "necessity for a revaluation of obscen-
ity." Theories of censorship based on "philosophies of infant damnation and
salvation by ignorance" make little appeal to one's rationality. The dif-
ficulty of legislation lies in the fact that obscenity is subjective, and a
determination depends upon the effect of material on hypothetical, unknown
persons; that determination is to be made by jurors, schooled neither in
literature, history or psychology. "Uncertainty has converted these laws
into whips against new ideas." At one period the taboo was religion, then
the state. Today it is sex. And, while the law has ordinarily been
interpreted as prohibiting material which will excite lust or lascivious
imagination, yet today it is used to suppress knowledge of sex and its
manifestations. The play, The Captive, was suppressed because of its
theme. The same applies to the recent condemnation of The Well of Lone-
liness. Mary Ware Dennett's pamphlet on Sex provides too much informa-
tion. Knowledge is a dangerous thing-in Boston and New York as well
as in Tennessee.
The authors point out the absurd implications of modern prudery. If
the effect on the immature and weak-minded is the test, then the literary
dipt of normal adults is limited to the innocuous standard of childhood and
senility. Quoting from court decisions, the authors make the following
840
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inquiries: "Is the author's reputation a factor?" "Does a brilliant style
overcome the obscene?" "Is immorality moral if delicately conveyed?"
"Is obscenity related to high price or scarcity of sales?" "Does a long booh,
in solid type and unillustrated, gain immunity?" "Do bored readers lend
protection?" What is obscenity anyhow? Have the age of the reader, the
period of publication, the customs of the people, anything to do with it?
Out of the welter of absurdity and contradiction in the attempted applica-
tion of these laws, one point emerges clearly: that in this field of the law,
criminal statutes are enforced which are so indefinite that a citizen might
easily "guess" himself into jail, in spite of the requirement of the Four-
teenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution that criminal statutes must
be so explicit as to avoid that possibility.' An indefinite criminal statute
offends the "due process" clause unless it is general, uniform, fixed and
certain. It violates the old maxim that "when the law is uncertain, there
is no law." It is equivalent to the Chinese code which prescribes punish-
ment for "improper conduct."
The searching analysis of this book, the conscientious research and the
effective argument make clear the folly of present legislation and judicial
pronouncement. One may still feel that in the present state of society
a line must be drawn somewhere aguinst pornographic matter, but the
inclination would be to draw it far to the left, and to ban only that which
practically all men agree is obscene. Where there is doubt, immunity is
the better solution. As with all repressive legislation, the evil does not
lie so much in the mischief of particular prosecutions, as in the timidity
and fear (as well as curiosity) aroused by social and legal taboos.
New York ARTHUR GARFiELD HAYS.
A History of Italian Law. By Carlo Calisse. Translated by Layton B.
Register. With Introductions by Frederick P. Walton and Hessel E.
Yntema. Boston, Little, Brown & Co., 1928. pp. lix, 827. $7.
It was the original plan of the editorial committee that this volume
devoted to Italy should treat all five of the usual divisions of European
law-public, civil, criminal, procedural, and commercial. It is therefore
natural that her law is scarcely mentioned in the volume on continental
criminal law, and little more noticed in that on criminal procedure; yet
this is unfortunate (and the greater attention paid to her civil procedure,
in the volume on that subject, correspondingly fortunate), for in Calisse's
work procedure is only discussed incidentally to the history of the sub-
stantive law, civil and criminal, although Italy is the classic land of penal
theories. Nor is there any treatment whatever of the commercial law,
in which her medieval eminence was equally notable. Whatever the merits
of the volume in the fields covered, it is therefore necessarily sormewhat
disappointing.
Its contents reflect the study of law as conducted in European schools.
Aside from a highly technical treatment of portions of constitutional la,
our own schools have done little with the public law, unless criminal law
be so classified and regarded as an exception. American rcadrs will not
be converted to new practices by an examination of Calisse's worl:. As
here given it consists of three books on public, criminal, and private law.
Although the first is only an abstract it receives 215 pages, as compared
with 273 and 309 devoted to the other topics; and despite the skill of
Mr. Register's drastic abbreviations, it hardly realizes the editorial com-
mittee's plan of providing "a helpful background" to the other bek:3.
1 United States v. Armstrong, 265 Fed. 683 (D. Ind. 1920).
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Afore than two-thirds of the discussion of the period up to 1100 are occupied
with details-dealing with changes in territorial divisions, in the names
and powers of administrative officers (Roman, Lombard, Frankish, and
ecclesiastical), and in the relation between civil and military power; with
the economic and legal origins and vicissitudes of social classes, and with
the organization of the army and finances--whose connection is not shown
(if indeed any existed) with the legal institutes developed in the other
books. For the remaining third, devoted to the administration of justice,
-and revealing the legal relations between the Romans and their con-
querors and the influence of the Church-a reader must be grateful. This
is not to say, of course, that the other matter has not an independent
excellence: the discussion of feudalism, for example, is admirably clear,
and that of the varying fortunes of the submerged Roman population is
of exceeding interest.
In some other respects, also, the work leaves, one dissatisfied. Very
little attention is given to developments since 1789; less than 35 pages
being devoted to the public and criminal law of this period (11 specially
written by the author and, particularly, Mr. Register for this edition),
and less than 13 to the history of the private law since Italian unification,
all specially written by Professor Calisse for this editon. The develop-
ments in public law before 1100 receive almost twice as much space as those
of the following centuries to 1789; and in the treatment of criminal law
the space allowance to the earlier period somewhat predominates. Although
the topical arrangement of the matter on private law makes a similarly
definite comparison impossible, it may be said that the only period in which
source citations are abundant is the Germanic. In every book the treat-
ment of the Nee-Roman epoch (after 1100) is relatively very sketchy. The
abundance and the overwhelming importance of its legislation is clearly
indicated (p. 351), but one learns nothing of it aside from occasional vague
references to "statutes of the medieval cities", "the reforms and legislation
of the 1700's," and the like, despite the existence of abundant studies on the
medieval ordinances. Book III, though essentially only a student's manual,
citing liberally parallel discussions in other textbooks, is a model historical
analysis of a national law. Its citations to sources are, however, scant
and perfunctory. Even those for the Germanic period are frequently un-
satisfying. Six passages in Tacitus, for example, are the sole authority
given for a dozen fundamental generalizations upon early Germanic law
and society.
However much one may lament over what the work does not contain,
every reader must admire the unusual clarity of its organization and
expression. Appreciation is here due equally to Mr. Register, who, as
already indicated, is- not merely a translator but a collaborator with the
author. His abridgment of Book I is so carefully done and smoothly
adjusted that it reads without suggestions of omission or irregular transi-
tions; he has added not merely valuable portions of the text, but also
various notes clarifying (occasionally correcting) the text and offering
additional guides to the reader.
Taking the three books together they offer a most interesting view of
the interaction of Roman, Germanic, and Canon law.
The author's attitude toward feudalism seems curiously unreflective. He
pronounces it "the most genuine expression of the Germanic as contrasted
with the Roman ideal" (p. 116); at the same time he exhibits its disorder-
ing effect upon the judicial organization (p. 81), the vitality it lent to
private vengeance. (p. 91), the manner in which it confined the civil and
criminal jurisdiction of the state (p. 95), and credits to it the conception
that judicial functions were a property right (p. 81). Yet despite these
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and other similar judgments one also finds statements, of the conventional
type, that Italian iristitutions emerged in the Neo-Roman period "rz-
juvenated" and "invigorated." Are not such traditional judgments under-
laid by naive assumptions respecting races? So far as regards feudalism
much can be said for the thesis that it was a calamity. How much can
be said for the proposition that it was a benefit, or rejuvenated or in-
vigorated anything that was desirable? To what other Germanic contribu-
tions-if not to "race" or feudalism--did Calisse attribute the rejuvenation
which he asserts? A reader seeks the answer in vain.
The influence of the Church, great and beneficent, is abundantly illus-
trated. It saw the sin in crimes; displacing purely objective tests (which
Calisse considers characteristically Germanic) by considerations of intent
which necessarily altered theories of the purpose of punishment, tending
to establish the theory of reform rather than the political end (which
Calisse regards as essentially Roman) of securing tranquility by penalties
sufficient to deter the criminal-notivithstanding its early favor to corporal
punishment (p. 412) and its use of excommunication (p. 311). It made
to social order transcendent contributions. It humanized in many ways
the family law. It introduced the will. On the other hand, there were
evils. As imperial authority decayed and the people rallied to the church
it became increasingly a political institution, and one ultimate result of
its union with the State, which turned into crimes theological heresies of
scientific inquiry ("the temporal laws were in every particular an echo
of the penalties of popes and councils"), was the horrors of the Inquisition
-so well revealed in Sir John Blacdonell's recent book on Historical Trials.
The influence of the Roman law is similarly illustrated.
A long list would be needed to indicate passages or sections admirable
for clarity or remarkable for suggestiveness. Any writer so inclined as
Calisse to philosophic thinking is bound to leave undeveloped many general-
izations provocative of thought. Such are those just indicated rcgarding
Germanic and Roman elements in the criminal law. But there are many
others: for example, the suggestion that the substitutional remedy of
damages is peculiarly Germanic (p. 356), that insistence upon compensa-
tion dominated early Germanic views of causation (p. 261). Dozens of
passages, too, arouse reflections upon our present law: when, for exmmple,
one reads of early Germanic apportionments of negligence (p. 224); of law
which illumines the borderline between theft and conversion (pp. 341, 343,
445); of medieval recidivists (p. 384); of talonie penalties (pp. 336, 415),
infinitely less ridiculous than most of our present fines; or laws diminish-
ing civil capacity or lowering social status-both, of course run head-on
into present dogmas of democracy-in punishment of offences like perjury
which forfeited public confidence (p. 525) ; of laws which took account of
social status-as in protecting peasants "as more likely to commit crime
through error or ignorance" (p. 364), and in aggravating the offences of
which defendants of higher social rank were guilty (pp. 363, 370, 371).
These may suffice as examples.
Every volume in the series has been similarly stimulating, but not all
in equal measure. This volume is the last. For it, and every other one, at
least the law-school teacher is duly thankful.
University of Pennsylvania Fr aces S. PUipaCiR.
The Development of Interzatio nl Law. By Sir Geoffrey Butler and Simon
Maccoby. New York, Longmans, Green & Co., 1923. pp. xav, 56G. $9.
Though this book is the product of the joint labors of Professor Butler
and his former pupil, Simon Alaccoby, the actual writing of the text was
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done by Professor Butler, and for the sake of convenience he alone will
be referred to as "the author."
The most striking feature of this work is the method of treatment-
quite the most effective which has yet been employed in dealing with
the subject. Believing that the changes in international law have been
the reflection of changes in the political theory and practice of states, the
author has divided his work into three major periods--the Age of the
Prince, the Age of the Judge, and the Age of the Concert. In each period
the major changes and developments are traced with an unusual sense of
the important and with admirable clarity and simplicity. The author rarely
,ventures -a conclusion or an opinion, but when he does it usually reveals
a strong sense of reality, and a thorough knowledge of the meaning of
history. The compactness of the work reveals the immense amount of
labor which must have been expended in its preparation.
To the American reader the large portion of the work which deals with
the development of the rules of land and sea warfare must have a special
significance. Here it must be noted that the author has treated the sub-
ject with an historical objectivity not always to be found in the numerous
post-war articles and works which have dealt with the subject. The author
is careful to warn the international lawyer to avoid the pitfalls of logic
into which so many have fallen since the war. History and logic must often
clash, and when they do, logic must give way or disaster will follow. No-
where is this more clearly illustrated than in the so-called "developments"
of the rules of war during 1914-1918. "Changed conditions" are said to
have necessitated developments in these rules, enlarging the rights of
belligerents and virtually destroying those of non-combatants and neutrals.
Logically the argument is correct, historically it is false. The virtual aboli-
tion of the distinction between combatants and non-combatants is one of
the most dangerous of the so-called developments mentioned. It utterly
ignores the historical development of the rules protecting the non-combatant,
and follows bare and cruel logic to its unfortunate extreme. This vital
distinction was based on considerations of morality and humanity and
followed a developing sense of civilized action. The force of the distinction
grew as civilization grew, bringing with its growth a gradual amelioration
of the cruelties and inhumanities of war. That non-combatants contribute
largely to sustaining the armies in the fields is nothing new; it has been
so for centuries. The distinction is, and always has been, arbitrary, not
logical, and to apply logic to the subject at this late day is to cast aside
the lessons of history and the dictates of humanity, and to return to
barbarism.
Likewise, to the reader who follows Professor Butler's developments of
the rules of sea warfare, it becomes apparent that the claimed changes here
are equally. false. Few seem to realize the danger of the blows struck
at international law and the property rights of neutrals and individuals
by the notorious British Orders in Council during the World War. They
wiped out the distinction between contraband, conditional contraband and
exempted goods. They extended the right of search even beyond the days
of the privateers, and ignored entirely the meaning of "blockade." These
changes may perhaps be defended in logic, but viewed historically, their
illegality is irrefutable. In time of war the rights of belligerents and
neutrals are, and always have been, diametrically opposed. The rules gov-
erning the right of the opposing parties in international law were based,
not on logic, but in compromise. These rules, evolved and fixed by mutual
concession, which was the only way they could be fixed, are as valid today
as in 1914. The conflict of interest which gave rise to these rules is as
great today as ever, and neither the conflict nor the rules may be erased
by syllogisms.
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That third of the volume dealing with the Age of the Concert will prob-
ably be of less vital concern to the American reader, yet it is an extremely
interesting account of the political and economic development of Europe
during the past century. America is by no means neglected, and the author
has viewed events on this side of the Atlantic with considerable shrewd-
ness and insight.
Mechanically, the volume leaves something to be desired. There is no
bibliography and the notes are placed at the end of the chapters. The
many reviewers who have called attention to this inconvenient and annoy-
ing practice of placing the notes at the end of chapters seem to have
made much less headway in England than in America. The index is excel-
lent, the proof reading almost perfect, and the physical make-up does credit
to the publishers.
Based on a wide knowledge of history, filtered through an objective and
realistic brain, this book must take its place as one of the most valuable
contributions to the history of international law yet made.
Houston, Texas JoHN P. BULLINGTON.
Law and Theory of Railway Dennrrage Charges. By Harleigh H. Hart-
man. New York, Traffic Publishing Co., 1928. pp. vi, 220. 5.
This is a convenient handbook dealing, as the author states in his
preface, with "the salient features of the theory, law and practice" in rail-
way demurrage matters, and "does not purport to be an exhaustive treatise
on this branch of the law." The gradual development of railway demurrage
based on analogy to demurrage under the maritime law, is briefly outlined;
the nature of the charge and the right of a railway to collect it, is
explained.
The remainder of the text, insofar as it deals with demurrage, sketches
briefly the jurisdiction of the Interstate Commerce Commission over, and
the requirements of the Interstate Commerce Act with respect to, its assess-
ment and collection in connection with interstate commerce. All state-
ments are supported by extensive quotation from, and citation of, decisions
of the courts and the Interstate Commerce Commission. The book affords
a readable and convenient introduction to a subject which affords some
of the knottiest problems arising under railway tariffs.
The last three chapters of the book deal with reciprocal demurrage,
penalty charges akin to demurrage, and application of the demurrage rule
to short line connections. The first of these is a purely academic dis-
cussion, as such demurrage does not exist in connection with interstate
commerce. It is applied in very few instances in connection with intrastate
commerce.
The heading of the last chapter is somewhat misleading. The chapter
deals primarily with the Per Diem Code which is not a code of demurrage
rules. The author states that the purpose of the Per Diem Code is to
secure the prompt return of cars to the owning carrier and that the per
diem charge is not intended to represent the rental value of a car. These
statements are erroneous.
The per diem charge is based on the average daily cost of owning and
maintaining a car and, as stated in a quotation made by the author at
page eight of his text from New York Hay Exchange v. Pcnnsylvania Rail-
road Coniparty, 14 I. C. C. 178, 184 (1903), may be taken as fairly repre-
senting the value of the use of a freight car.
Per diem has been said to be "in the nature of a penalty" but its primary
purpose is to afford the carrier owning a car adequate compensation from
another carrier using that car. The prompt return of cars to their owmers
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is brought about by the Car Service Rules, which have been adopted by
mutual agreement by the members of the American Railway Association,
But for those rules, one carrier, as long as it had use in revenue service
for cars belonging to another, would have no incentive to return them to
the owner.
The author cites numerous Conference Rulings of the Interstate Com-
merce Commission as authority. These rulings, unless incorporated in
formal decisions of the Commission, are of no force as they have recently
been rescinded.
New Haven, Connedticut W. W. MAnlRya.
Principles of Sociology. By Rudolph M. Binder. New York, Prentice-Hall,
Inc., 1928. pp. xvi, 609. $5.
Perilous is the course of the man who would make a synthesis of extant
knowledge of anthropology, psychology, endocrinology, economics, sociology,
philosophy, and the various specialized branches of human relations. Such
a synthesis may be the ultimate desideratum of some "sociologists"; at
present, however, few of the component branches of this all-embracing
would-be science have reached the dignity and the accuracy which justify
the use of the word "science" as a definition of their discipline. Any
attempt, therefore, at the writing of this definitive sociology is foredoomed
to failure. Professor Binder's Principles of Sociology undertakes an her-
culean task, and fails bravely and worthily.
The initial principle of sociology is taken to be this: namely, "that the
individual seeks completion and finds it only through interaction with his
social environment; the give-and-take relation alone can turn his various
capacities into abilities, useful to himself and to society." In this state-
ment the author defines his field, and it concerns the individual more than
it does the society. For him "sociology" would be rather the study of the
individual in his social relationships, and the effect of social customs and
phenomena upon the individual, than the study of the social customs and
phenomena themselves. This emphasis upon the individual is patent
throughout the whole work:
"[The individual] seeks his own completion. In this search lie all the
possibilities of achievement and of tragedy. For, his completion is imnpos-
sible without others, and here lie the fundamental aspects of all social life.
He may achieve or fail not only because he strives, or fails to strive, but
because the society in which his lot is cast is favorable or unfavorable to
the development of his uniqueness. In either case, his fate is bound up
with the society in which he lives, and the mere expansion of his biological
needs, if nothing else, holds him there. He is a social animal by sheer
necessity."
Individuals, then, are classified and reclassified, biologically, psychologi-
cally, economically, and in many other fashions. There are vitality, men-
tality, morality, and sociality classes; endocrine classes; thymic individuals;
thyroid individuals-not to mention the racial, age, and other social classes.
Professor Binder writes cogently and well. But the net result of his
work is the impression of a series of essays all having some bearing upon
sociology, rather than of an authoritative description of society and its
institutions. He hales before him various theories, such as that of the
effect of the geographic environment on human beings, or that of instincts,
or that of "consciousness of kind," or that of Nordic supremacy, and by
his incisive criticism shows their weaknesses and their strength; he pre-
sents succinct accounts of the various glands and their functions, and of
the differentiation of man into races; he even describes in simple, com-
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prehensible terms the main social institutions, and some of the more im-
portant practical social problems. But after having read the book, will
the layman, or the student, have a clear idea of the evolution of social
institutions, such as marriage and the family, government, religion, and
the like? These are the sine qua. ?on for the student of society, whether
lawyer, statesman, social worker, or sociologist; and to them the author
devotes only one-fifth of his book.
For the rest, Part I, though labelled The Social Population, is concerned,
after an introductory discussion of the composition of the population, with
the uniqueness of the individual; so also is Part II, Social Motives. Part
Il, The Social Processes, is a fatally superficial series of essays on such
topics as Domination, Toleration, Social Values, and The Socially Incom-
plete. Here the author forsakes his high standards of induction and scien-
tific treatment, and, like too many other sociologists, spins his theories
and illustrates them. The final section of the book, on Social Aims, is weak
when it discusses Social Progress, and strong when Improvement of Health
and The Integration of Social Activities are examined.
There is much sage judgment and penetrating analysis of social ph-
nomena in the pages of this latest Principles of Sociology. But by its
attempt to bridge the gaps between psychology and the various social
sciences, it has succeeded only in falling into the abyss wherein lie count-
less other textbooks on sociology.
Yale University JAMES G. LnuwN.
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